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RIGHT TO DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT WHERE MORTGAGEE PURCHASING AT FORECLOSURE SALE
HAS LATER RESOLD AT A PROFIT.
By WmLIAm Q. D1, FUNiAK*
The purpose of this brief discussion is to consider some
aspects of the mortgagee's right to a deficiency judgment, where
the mortgagee, upon forclosure, has bought in the property at a
sum less than the amount of the mortgage indebtedness, but
thereafter sells the property at a price in excess of his bid at the
foreclosure sale and sufficient to extinguoish the amount of the
deficiency judgment sought. It is not intended to include any
discussion, other than in passing, of statutes relating to deficiency
judgments, or the question of the liability of particular parties,
such as indorsers of mortgage notes, for deficiencies.
As a foundation for approaching the situation it is perhaps
necessary to restate briefly certain fundamentals which are well
known to the reader, and the writer makes due apology therefor.
A mortgage in its usual form is executed by the property
owner, of course, as security for a debt owed by him to the
mortgagee, the creditor being entitled, in case of nonpayment of
the debt, to seek his reimbursement from the sale of the mortgaged property. Where the sum received from the sale is
insufficient to reimburse the creditor entirely, he may usually
obtain a personal judgment against the debtor for such
deficiency. 1
*LL. B., 1924, University of Virginia. Assistant to managing
editor of Callaghan & Co., Chicago; member of Kentucky and California
bars; author of articles and notes in A. L. R., Corpus Juris, Bancroft's
Code; Practice, Texas Jurispudence, etc.
1 See, for example, In re White's Estate, 322 Pa. St. 85, 185 A. 589
(1936).
In some states, the right to a deficiency judgment appears to be
dependent upon statute, rather than on general equitable principles. See
Lewis v. Matteson, 257 Ill. App. 1 (1930); Metz v. Dionne, 250 Ill. App.
369 (1928); City Real Estate Co. v. Realty Construction Corp., 167 Misc.
379, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 312 (1938); Stellmacher v. Simpson, 195 Wis. 635,
219 N. W. 343 (1928).
In other states, granting the mortgagee a deficiency judgment may
rest in the court's discretion, and the light thereto is dependent upon
the circumstances of the case. See Atlantic Shores Corp. v. Zetterlund,
103 Fla. 761, 138 So. 50 (1931).
Equity's power in absence of statute to render deficiency judgment,
see note, 34 A. L. R. 1015.
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As a matter of actual fact, because of lack of bids, or
because of insufficiency in the amount of the bids at the foreclosure sale, the creditor frequently is compelled to buy in the
property himself. In any event, whether the property is purchased at the foreclosure sale by a stranger or by the mortgagee
himself, the purchaser is usually, in the absence of any special
agreement, entitled to take the property free from the lien of
the mortgage, and the obligor for the payment of the debt is
responsible for any deficit.
However, it must be admitted that some argument may be
advanced that since the property represents security for the
debt, if in any course of dealing at all with the property the
creditor ends up by receiving through such property an amount
more than equal to the amount of the debt, his debt is satisfied
and he should be entitled to recover no additional sums, as for
instance through a deficiency judgment against the morgagor.
Thus, where the mortgagee has bought in the property at the
forclosure sale for an amount less than that of the debt owing
to him, but has later sold the property at such considerable
profit that his monetary return through the property has
equalled or exceeded the amount of the debt, it has been contended that he is entitled to nothing further.
A recent decision in Kentucky 2 offers an interesting example
of this argument. It appeared therein that a landowner
borrowed some $20,000 from a land bank, executing a first
mortgage on his property. Subsequently, he borrowed additional
amounts from two state banks, executing to them second mortgages on the property. While he met his payments on the first
mortgage, he apparently was unable to do so as to the second
mortgages, and eventually he conveyed his title in the property
to the state banks on condition of cancellation of his indebtedness
to them and upon condition that they assume the mortgage
indebtedness to the land bank. The state banks thereafter conveyed the property to individuals who also assumed the mortgage indebtedness to the land bank.
Upon their failure to meet the payments on the mortgage,
the land bank foreclosed, bought in the property itself for some
$13,000, and sought a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor
2Kentucky

Joint Stock Land Bank v. Farmers Exchange Bank,

274 Ky. 525, 119 S. W. (2d)

873 (1938).
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and those assuming the mortgage indebtedness. Following
rendition of a judgment dismissing that portion of the petition
seeking such personal judgment and after the land bank's appeal
was prosecuted therefrom, the land bank sold the property to a
stranger for a total consideration in excess of its bid at the foreclosure sale, sufficient to extinguish the deficiency judgment
that it sought.
At that point the appellees entered the contention (which
the court termed "indeed a novel one") that the profit realized
by the land bank by such resale satisfied the unpaid balance of
the debt, after crediting the net proceeds of its bid thereon, and
wiped out the deficiency which is sought to recover from the
appellees.
In reversing the judgment of the lower court dismissing
that portion of the petition seeking deficiency judgments, the
appellate court refused to give serious consideration to the
appellees' contention. It pointed out that whether the land bank
would ever collect the consideration from its vendee was problematical, since its payment was spread over a long period of
years, and whether the vendee's installment promises would
be promptly or at all met was uncertain. Moreover, it declared
that there was no distinction between a purchase at a foreclosure
sale by a stranger and purchase by the mortgagee, and that in
each case the mortgagor was still responsible for any deficit.
It quoted from a standard text work 3 to the effect that the sum
for which mortgaged property is sold must be taken, as between
the parties to the sale, as conclusive test of its value, and that
the amount of the deficiency is to be ascertained accordingly and
not by taking the market value at the time, in case it exceeds the
amount received from the sale.
The Kentucky court also distinguished a decision of the
Tennessee Court of Appeals 4 which the appellees cited to support
their contention. The Tennessee case is somewhat similar so far
as concerns the facts that the mortgagee foreclosed, bought in
the property, sold at a profit, and sought a deficiency judgment.
However, the foreclosure appears to have been unfair to a degree
'Jones on Mortgages (8th ed.), § 2206.

See also 42 Corpus Juris 295; Reed v. Inness, (Mo. App.) 102
S. W. (2d) 711 (1937); In re White's Estate, 322 Pa. St. 85, 185 A.
689 (1936).
'Union Stock Joint Land Bank v. Knox County, 20 Tenn. App. 273,
97 S.W. (2d) 842 (1936).
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amounting to fraud, and the court designated the price paid as
inadequate. Upon those grounds the court looked with disfavor
upon the attempt to obtain a deficiency judgment, characterizing it as a "windfall" sought by the mortgagee after it had,
through the resale of the property, obtained an amount sufficient
to cover the entire obligation.
In regard to the matter of an inadequate price being paid
at the foreclosure sale, it is interesting to note that in the Kentucky case the land was appraised, prior to the foreclosure sale,
at $8,475, and the mortgagee bid in the property for a sum
slightly in excess of $13,000. 5 Thus, no ground appears to have
existed for contending that the price paid was inadequate, and
indeed no such contention was advanced. Nor was any attack
made upon the fairness of the foreclosure proceedings.
Returning again to momentary consideration of the Teniiessee decision, such decision appears to be in line with a number
of decisions in forclosure proceedings brought about due to the
period of economic depression. 6 Many appellate courts have
evidently considered it unjust to grant a deficiency judgment
where the mortgagee has been made whole by means of the
mortgaged property itself. Indeed, it is common knowledge that
during the piling up of foreclosure proceedings during the
depression, many trial courts, even in the face of repeated reversals, consistently refused to grant deficiency judgments at all,
continuing the proceedings until the mortgagee was willing to
enter into some compromise agreement with the mortgagor, such
as agreeing to accept the property itself in full settlement of the
indebtedness.
Thus, the principles referred to by the Kentucky court that
the amount of the deficiency is to be ascertained by the sum for
which the property was sold at the foreclosure sale, and not by
taking the market value of the property even though exceeding
in amount the sum received at the sale, has been departed from
by several courts. Where the mortgagee has purchased the
property at the foreclosure sale, they have held that equity
r In some states, statutes now require appraisal of the property
See, for example, Louisiana and New York

before foreclosure sale.
statutes.

6 For comprehensive annotations upon the financial depression as
justification for moratorium or other relief to mortgagor (including
decisions under statutes in that regard), see 104 A. L. R. 375; 97 A. L. R.
1123; 96 A. L. R. 853; 94 A. L. R. 1352; 90 A. L. R. 1330.
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demands, in view of the times, that the market value of the land
be considered, and where it equals or exceeds the amount of the
debt, deficiency judgments have been denied. 7 Of course, in some
states, by statute, it may be shown as a defense to a deficiency
judgment that the property was worth the amount of the debt
or that the price bid was less than the real value of the property. 8
While such decisions, referred to above, did not actually
involve a situation where the mortgagee later resold the property at a profit, it will be seen that the situation therein is
closely analagous, for if the appraised market value is greater
than the price paid at the foreclosure sale it may naturally be
assumed that the mortgagee who obtains the property at the foreclosure can, if he wishes, sell at the market price at a considerable
profit.
However, even in cases similar to the Tennessee case whereprofits
on resale are considered in their effect on the right to
in
deficiency judgments, it will be found (as in the Tennessee case)
that fraud or unfairness in the foreclosure sale, or inadequacy
in the price bid therein, is the turning point upon which the
decision is made. In this regard, consider a New York case 9
in which property subject to a mortgage of $9,000 was bought
in at the forclosure sale by the mortgagee for $500, and a judgment was also obtained by the mortgagee against the mortgagor
for a deficiency in excess of $10,000. Thereafter, the mortgagee
sold to a bona fide purchaser for $13,000, all cash. In view of
that fact the court refused to allow enforcement of the deficiency
judgment and relieved the mortgagor from such judgment.
The New York case is distinguishable from the Kentucky
case upon at least two points. First, the price paid at the foreclosure sale was obviously inadequate, a fact not appearing in
the Kentucky case; second, the prize received on the resale was
See Cooper v. Knight, 117 Fla. 32, 157 So. 27 (1934); Better Plan
Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Holden, 114 N. J. Eq. 537, 169 A. 289 (1933);
Monaghan v. May, 242 App. Div. 64, 273 N. Y. S. 475 (1934).
On the other hand, it has been said that the mortgagee has the
right to buy in if he can for an amount wholly inadequate in relation
to the value of the property, and misfortune or hard times do not
affect the matter. Reed v. Inness, (Mo. App.) 102 S. W. (2d)
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(1937), and cases cited therein.
',See Richmond Mortgage & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., 210 N. C. 29, 185 S. E. 482 (1936); Tarboro Bldg. & Loan Assn. v.
Bell, 210 N. C. 35, 185 S. E. 486 (1936).
"Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Adam Schumann Associates, 150
Misc. 221, 268 N. Y. S. 674 (1934).
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all in cash, while in the Kentucky case the consideration was to
be paid in installments over a long period of time, with a natural
doubt as to whether it would in fact be received.
While the Kentucky case applies the rule existing prior to
the conditions resulting from the depression, it must be noted
that in that case as well as in older cases, the sales were fairly
conducted and adequate prices were bid. Thus, in 1912, the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 0
refused to credit against a deficiency judgment the amount
received on resale which was in excess of the price at which the
mortgagee bid in the property on the foreclosure sale, the sale
on foreclosure having been fairly conducted, although the price
bid was less than the amount of the debt.
Accordingly, it is believed that upon analysis of later cases
appearing to vary from the former rule, it will be found that in
fact the price bid at the foreclosure sale was inadequate or
inequitably low due to economic conditions.

" Ramsden v. Keene Five Cents Say. Bank, 198 Fed. 807, 117 C. C. A.
449 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912).
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